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KRUSE V. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.
(decided September 10, 2004)
JENNIFER KATEHOS*
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”1 At the same time, when an administrative agency2 interprets a statute to enforce the laws of the United
States,3 courts often defer to the agency’s declaration of what the
law is. In the celebrated case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,4 the United States Supreme Court designed a test for courts to apply when determining whether to defer
to an agency’s statutory interpretation contained in a legislative
rule.5 Chevron, however, only considered agency interpretations in
* J.D. candidate New York Law School, 2005. The author wishes to thank Professor Cameron Stracher, Rebecca Kaiser, and Richard Sugar for their insight, invaluable feedback, and encouragement.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2. See generally James Hunnicutt, Another Reason to Reform the Federal Regulatory System: Agencies’ Treating Nonlegislative Rules as Binding Law, 41 B.C. L. REV. 153 (1999)
(“Congress creates administrative agencies to execute many of the statutes it enacts.”).
3. See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5, at
151 (4th ed. 2002) (“Agencies give meaning to ambiguous language in the statutes they
administer through use of a wide variety of procedures and formats. The potential
formats include legislative rules, adjudications, interpretive rules, policy statements,
manuals, guidelines, staff instructions, opinion letters, and litigating positions.”).
4. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. When Congress creates an administrative agency, it delegates many powers to
the agency, “such as the authority to perform investigations, to conduct adjudications
and . . . [most relevant to this Case Comment,] to adopt rules. Generally, agencies
create two types of rules: legislative rules and nonlegislative rules.” Hunnicutt, supra
note 2.
Legislative rules, often called regulations, have the same force of law as statutes,
and therefore must be promulgated only through formal or informal rulemaking procedures set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. Formal rulemaking is required
“[w]hen rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing,” and the procedures are set forth in sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2005). Otherwise, informal rulemaking
is required, and the procedures – “public notice of the proposed rule, receipt and consideration of comments on the proposed rule, and issuance of the final rule incorporating a statement of basis and purpose” – are set forth in section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. PIERCE, supra note 3, § 6.1, at 301. “[S]ection 553 procedure is accurately referred to ‘notice-and-comment’ rulemaking.” BENJAMIN W. MINTZ
993
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legislative rules, and courts were left wondering whether the Chevron test, which is highly deferential to the agency, should also be
applied to statutory interpretations contained in nonlegislative
rules.6 Instead of providing clear guidance, subsequent Supreme
Court cases have only confused this issue,7 and the question remains: What level of deference should a court give to an agency’s
statutory interpretation contained in a document that does not inherently have the force of law? Should a nonlegislative rule enjoy
the same level of deference as a legislative rule, or should a nonlegislative rule, by nature of its format, be accorded a “lesser” level of
deference?
In Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc.,8 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of
what level of deference it should give an agency’s statutory interpre& NANCY G. MILLER, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO
FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 47 (2d ed. 1991).
Nonlegislative rules, on the other hand, do not have the same force of law as statutes. “Rather, they represent recommendations and advice. Nonlegislative rules have
innumerable synonyms, such as interpretative rules, statements of policy, rules of
agency organization and guidelines.” Hunnicutt, supra note 2. Nonlegislative rules are
excepted from the notice and comment requirements of Administrative Procedure Act
section 553, and thus “represent a relatively low-cost and flexible way for agencies to
articulate their positions, at least in tentative terms.” John F. Manning, Recent Decision of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Chapter: Nonlegislative
Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 914 (2004). Nonlegislative rules are excepted “to
balance the need for public input with competing societal interests favoring the efficient and expeditious conduct of certain government affairs.” MINTZ & MILLER, supra,
at 48.
Unless “Congress explicitly requires an agency to resolve some issues through issuance of legislative rules,” agencies have a choice whether to issue a legislative rule or a
nonlegislative rule. PIERCE, supra note 3, § 6.9, at 374.
From an agency’s perspective, this choice among types of rules involves a
tradeoff. Legislative rules have much more powerful legal effects than
[nonlegislative rules]. Yet, legislative rules often require many years and
many thousands of staff hours to issue. It would be impossible for any
agency to use the long and expensive process of issuing legislative rules to
address definitively and in detail every issue that arises in the process of
implementing a regulatory or benefits program.
Id. § 6.1, at 305 (citation omitted).
6. WILLIAM F. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 386 (2nd
ed. 2001).
7. See generally 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.5 (4th
ed. Supp. 2004) (summarizing recent “confusing” United States Supreme Court decisions on the scope of Chevron deference).
8. 383 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2004).
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tation contained in a nonlegislative rule, i.e., a policy statement.
Specifically, in evaluating the validity of a cause of action against
home-mortgage companies by a class of home-buyers, the court addressed what level of deference it was required to give the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1 (“Policy
Statement”)9 issued by the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (“HUD”). In the Policy Statement, HUD
interpreted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)10
to prohibit mortgage lenders from charging home-buyers more
than the actual cost of settlement services provided by a third party
without conducting any additional services to justify the price markup. Relying on the Policy Statement, plaintiff homeowners challenged the defendant mortgage companies’ billing practices.11 In
holding that the homebuyers stated a cause of action, the Second
Circuit applied Chevron deference to HUD’s Policy Statement. This
decision squarely contradicted the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Krzalic v. Republic Title
Co.12
This case comment contends that while the Kruse court may
have correctly held the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action, the
court should not have accorded Chevron deference to the Policy
Statement. Although it was due some deference, it was only due
the “lesser” level of deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.13 Under Skidmore, HUD’s Policy Statement, as a nonlegislative
rule, was only “entitled to respect.”14
The Kruse plaintiffs were a class of home-buyers who obtained
federally related home mortgage loans from the defendant mortgage companies and were required, in connection with their loans,
to purchase settlement services.15 The defendants “outsourced” the
performance of some of these required settlement services to third
9. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers,
and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. 53,052
(Oct. 18, 2001).
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617 (2005).
11. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53.
12. 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2002).
13. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
14. Id. at 140.
15. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53. 12 U.S.C. § 2602(3) (2005) provides:
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party providers and paid the providers’ fees.16 For example, “the
defendants outsourced document preparation to third parties at a
typical per-service cost to the defendants of $20 to $50.”17 The
plaintiffs claimed, however, that when the defendants billed them
for the outsourced settlement services, they were not charged the
actual prices.18 Instead, the defendants, without performing any
additional services, allegedly charged the plaintiffs higher fees and
pocketed the difference.19 The plaintiffs argued this billing practice of “marking-up” fees amounted to “splitting charges” and was
therefore a violation of RESPA section 8(b) (“section 8(b)”).20
By enacting RESPA in 1974, Congress sought to initiate reforms in the residential real estate settlement process.21 RESPA was
designed to protect home-buyers “from unnecessarily high settlement charges caused by certain abusive practices” adopted by mortgage providers in the home purchasing process.22 One such
abusive practice is “splitting charges,” which is prohibited by section
8(b).23 Specifically, section 8(b) provides that “[n]o person shall
give and no person shall accept any portion, split, or percentage of
any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan other than for services actually
performed.”24
the term “settlement service” includes any service provided in connection
with a real estate settlement including, but not limited to, the following:
title searches, title examinations, the provision of title certificates, title insurance, services rendered by an attorney, the preparation of documents,
property surveys, the rendering of credit reports or appraisals, pest and fungus inspections, services rendered by a real estate agent or broker, the origination of a federally related mortgage loan (including, but not limited to,
the taking of loan applications, loan processing, and the underwriting and
funding of loans), and the handling of the processing, and closing of
settlement.
16. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 53.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 53–54.
21. 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2005).
22. Id.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2005).
24. Id.
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Congress charged HUD with enforcing RESPA and granted
HUD the authority “to prescribe such rules and regulations, [and]
to make such interpretations . . . as may be necessary to achieve the
purposes of [RESPA].”25 Pursuant to this authority, HUD promulgated a set of rules to implement RESPA,26 known as “Regulation
X.”27 The initial version of Regulation X, however, did not elaborate on the “splitting charges” language of section 8(b).28 HUD
later amended the rules, and although the latest version of Regulation X does address section 8(b), it does not explicitly state whether
the prohibition against splitting charges covers mark-up billing
practices, such as those alleged in Kruse.29 For that reason, HUD
issued the Policy Statement30 to declare that it interprets section
8(b) to prohibit mark-ups.31 Specifically, the Policy Statement provided that:
[HUD] interprets [section] 8(b) of RESPA to prohibit all
unearned fees, including, but not limited to, cases where:
. . . one settlement service provider marks-up the cost of
the services performed or goods provided by another settlement service provider without providing any additional
25. 12 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2005).
26. Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. §§ 3500.1–3500.21 (2005).
27. Id. § 3500.1 (2005).
28. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 60.
29. Id. Regulation X provides:
A charge by a person for which no nominal services are performed or for
which duplicative fees are charged is an unearned fee and violates [RESPA
Section 8(b)]. The source of the payment does not determine whether or
not a service is compensable. Nor may the prohibitions of this Part be
avoided by creating an arrangement wherein the purchaser of services splits
the fee.
24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c) (2005).
30. The Policy Statement was a nonlegislative rule because it was issued without
going through notice and comment procedures, did not establish new law, and did not
impose any new duties on the regulated community. The Policy Statement simply advised the community of HUD’s interpretation of section 8(b). See also discussion supra
note 5 (outlining the basic differences between legislative rules and nonlegislative
rules). See generally PIERCE, supra note 3, §§ 6.3–6.5 (distinguishing between legislative
rules and nonlegislative rules, i.e., policy statements, interpretive rules, and procedural
rules).
31. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers,
and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. at 53,059.
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actual, necessary, and distinct services, goods, or facilities
to justify the additional charge . . . .32

The Kruse plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the defendants
violated section 8(b) by charging more than the actual cost of settlement services provided by third parties without conducting any
additional services to justify the price change.33 The plaintiffs
urged the court to defer to HUD’s interpretation of section 8(b) in
the Policy Statement, but the court resisted.34 In holding that the
express language of section 8(b) “unambiguously does not apply to
mark-ups,”35 the District Court not only dismissed the plaintiffs’
claim, but also chose to ignore the Policy Statement, declaring that
HUD’s [section] 8(b) interpretation contained therein “was either
an impermissible one or entitled to no deference.”36
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, holding the plaintiffs had stated a valid cause of
action because section 8(b), as interpreted by HUD in the Policy
Statement, prohibits mark-up billing practices.37 In reaching this
holding, the Kruse court first concluded that the express language
of section 8(b) is vague and ambiguous regarding mark-ups.38 In
the absence of clear statutory language on the plaintiffs’ issue, then,
the court decided that the Policy Statement deserved Chevron
deference.39
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.,
an environmental group challenged a legislative rule adopted by
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that interpreted the
32. Id.
33. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 52.
34. Id. at 53–54.
35. Id. at 54.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 61–62. The court, however, dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim regarding
“overcharging,” a billing practice where a mortgage company charges a homebuyer
more than the actual cost of settlement services it provided itself. The court concluded
that section 8(b) unambiguously does not apply to “overcharges.” Id. at 55–58.
38. Id. But see Boulware v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 291 F.3d 261, 267 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that § 8(b) clearly and unambiguously does not prohibit mark-ups),
Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875, 879–80 (7th Cir. 2002) (same), and Haug v.
Bank of Am., 317 F.3d 832, 838 (8th Cir. 2003) (same).
39. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 61.
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words “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act.40 The United States
Supreme Court, in upholding the EPA’s interpretation of “stationary source” as a permissible interpretation of an ambiguous statute,
concluded that a court should defer to an agency’s interpretation
in a legislative rule if the statute is clear and the interpretation is
consistent with the statute, or if the statute is vague and the interpretation is reasonable.41
The Kruse court acknowledged, however, that Chevron deference was not its only option.42 Another level of deference, one not
as deferential to the agency as the standard set forth in Chevron, was
described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,43 a case that considered judicial
review in the context of agency interpretations contained in nonlegislative rules. In Skidmore, the United States Supreme Court held
that when a court must determine the proper interpretation of a
statute, it may give consideration to the agency’s nonlegislative
rules interpreting the statute, even though they are “not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority.”44 The weight a court
should give such a nonlegislative rule “depend[s] upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade.”45
Although statutory interpretations contained in legislative
rules are generally entitled to Chevron deference and those contained in nonlegislative rules are generally entitled to Skidmore deference,46 the Kruse court applied Chevron deference to the Policy
Statement. In doing so, the court relied upon language from United
40. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840–41 (1984).
41. Id. at 842–43. To be precise, Chevron deference has a two-step approach. The
first step is to determine whether the statutory language is clear or ambiguous. If the
statute is clear and the interpretation is consistent with the statute, the interpretation is
upheld. Additionally, if the statute is clear but the interpretation is inconsistent, the
interpretation is void and the challenger wins. If the statute is ambiguous, however, the
second step is invoked, and the court must ascertain whether the agency’s interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. If the interpretation is reasonable, it is
upheld. See generally PIERCE, supra note 3, § 3.2 (analyzing the “Chevron two-step”).
42. See Kruse, 383 F.3d at 55.
43. 323 U.S. 134.
44. Id. at 140.
45. Id.
46. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
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States v. Mead Corporation,47 a case that took “pains to distinguish”
Chevron from Skidmore.48
In Mead, the Mead Corporation challenged a classification ruling by the United States Customs Service that interpreted the word
“diary” in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.49
In assessing whether the classification ruling, an informal adjudication, was entitled to judicial deference, the United States Supreme
Court held that “classification rulings are best treated like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines.’ They are beyond the Chevron pale.”50 The
Court further held:
that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that
the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a
comparable congressional intent.51

The Kruse court reasoned that the Policy Statement was entitled to Chevron deference because it contained an interpretation,
Congress had authorized HUD to make interpretations,52 and
HUD issued the Policy Statement “in the exercise of that authority.”53 In addition, given that the Policy Statement was issued
mainly in response to a 2001 Seventh Circuit decision,54 “the Policy
Statement was apparently the culmination of HUD’s reflections on
47. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
48. Krzalic, 314 F.3d at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
49. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 225.
50. Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587).
51. Id. at 226–27.
52. See supra text accompanying note 25.
53. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 60.
54. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act Statement of Policy 2001-1: Clarification of Statement of Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers,
and Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees Under Section 8(b), 66 Fed. Reg. at 53,052
(explaining that the Policy Statement was issued in part to address § 8(b) questions
raised by Echevarria v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 256 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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the meaning of section 8(b) as applied to mark-ups over a period of
years.”55 According to the court, HUD “possesses expertise regarding the market for federally related home mortgages,” and the Policy Statement fit within the parameters of that expertise.56 Finally,
other circuits had “deferred to the Policy Statement, albeit in the
course of determining when ‘yield spread premiums’ violate RESPA
[section] 8(a), rather than whether mark-ups are covered by section 8(b).”57
Together, these reasons led the court to determine that Chevron deference was the appropriate level of deference to accord to
the Policy Statement. The court concluded by applying HUD’s interpretation of section 8(b) and finding that the plaintiffs had
stated a valid cause of action.58 It then remanded the case to the
district court to determine whether the defendants did, in fact, engage in mark-up billing practices.59
Under Kruse, homebuyers can now sue mortgage companies
for charging marked-up fees for settlement services outsourced to
third party providers. While the Kruse holding appears to ultimately further the purposes of RESPA, the court should not have
accorded HUD’s Policy Statement Chevron deference. On the contrary, the Policy Statement was only due the level of deference described in Skidmore.
As the Kruse court noted, the United States Supreme Court
proposed in Mead that Chevron deference may still be given to a
nonlegislative rule that interprets a statute if Congress authorized
the agency to make such rules.60 Notwithstanding this and HUD’s
authority to make interpretations,61 the Policy Statement did not
deserve Chevron deference. This proposition is buttressed by a
closer inspection of Mead. “Although [Mead] reserv[ed] the possibility of applying Chevron deference to agency interpretations announced in less formal settings [than legislative rules], the Court
55. Kruse, 383 F.3d at 61.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Heimmermann v. First Union Mortgage Corp.,
305 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2002); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004
(9th Cir. 2002); Glover v. Standard Fed. Bank, 283 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2002)).
58. Id. at 61–62.
59. Id. at 62.
60. Id. at 58–59.
61. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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made clear that such application would turn on the identification
of circumstances affirmatively indicating a congressional intent to
provide for such deference.”62 In Mead, the Court noted directly
that Congress had delegated general rulemaking authority to Customs and, as a result, at least some Customs rules carried the force
of law and could fall within the scope of Chevron.63 The Court also
noted, however, that even though “Congress had classification rulings [the informal adjudication format at issue in Mead] in mind”
when making the delegation, “the terms of the congressional delegation [gave] no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of
law.”64 Therefore, the Court held that the informal adjudication
was not deserving of Chevron deference.65 Although Customs could
make informal adjudications that bind with the force of law, it
could not do so in the format at issue in Mead. In other words, the
format of the informal adjudication ultimately determined whether
it was within the scope of Chevron.
Like the congressional delegation of Customs’ rulemaking authority in Mead, HUD’s authority to make interpretations signifies
“that at least some HUD interpretations of RESPA [carry the force
of law and] are within the scope of Chevron.”66 The Policy Statement, however, was not one of these interpretations. As with the
format of adjudication in Mead, the format of an interpretation ultimately determines whether it is within the scope of Chevron.67 In
deciding what level of deference to give an interpretation, “the
court must . . . identify a delegation of power [from Congress not
just to make interpretations, but] to make binding interpretations
through the particular format chosen by the agency.”68 The Kruse
62. Manning, supra note 5, at 938.
63. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231–32; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1624 (2005) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to “make such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Tariff Act of 1930].”).
64. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 231–32.
65. Id. at 231.
66. Krzalic, 314 F.3d at 878.
67. An agency’s interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to administer can be
presented in many formats, including legislative rules and nonlegislative rules. See generally PIERCE, supra note 3, § 3.5.
68. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 (1990).
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court, however, did not identify whether Congress authorized HUD
to make binding interpretations in a nonlegislative rule, the particular format chosen by HUD; it merely identified a delegation of
authority from Congress to HUD to interpret RESPA. Had the
court undertook this format identification, it would have observed
that the terms of the delegation give no indication that Congress
intended to delegate authority to HUD to issue interpretations in
nonlegislative rules with the force of law.69 Although HUD can
make interpretations that bind with the force of law, it cannot do so
in the nonlegislative rule format of the Policy Statement.
Congress was silent about format in its delegation of interpretive authority to HUD,70 and this silence should not be construed to
mean that Congress intended to authorize HUD to make binding
interpretations in nonlegislative rules. In the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),71 Congress itself defined several categories of
rules, including nonlegislative rules.72 In time, “[b]oth Congress
and the courts . . . recognized . . . that [nonlegislative rules], exempt from notice and comment procedure by APA [section] 553,
do not have binding effect either on citizens or on courts.”73 “It
follows that Congress did not intend to delegate authority to any
agency to make a policy decision that binds judges and citizens
through the use of [nonlegislative rules].”74 Congress, therefore,
did not intend to delegate authority to HUD to bind courts and the
public with an interpretation contained in nonlegislative rules. The
Kruse court, consequently, should not have accorded Chevron defer-

69. See supra text accompanying note 25.
70. See id.
71. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–583, 701–706, 801–808, 3105, 3344, 6362, 7562 (2005). The
Administrative Procedure Act was passed by Congress in 1946 “to promote uniformity,
fairness and public participation in how agencies operate.” Hunnicutt, supra note 2, at
156. “One of the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] major accomplishments was the establishment of minimum procedural requirements for many types of agency proceedings,” including formal and informal rulemaking procedures. MINTZ & MILLER, supra
note 5, at 3. See also discussion supra note 5 (discussing formal rulemaking, informal
rulemaking, and the basic differences between legislative rules and nonlegislative
rules).
72. See PIERCE, supra note 3, § 6.1.
73. Id. § 6.4, at 327.
74. Id. § 3.5, at 154.

\\server05\productn\N\NLR\49-3\NLR305.txt

1004

unknown

Seq: 12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

25-APR-05

7:46

[Vol. 49

ence to the Policy Statement, because Chevron deference has the
result of giving its subject binding effect.75
The consequences of giving a nonlegislative rule, such as the
Policy Statement, binding effect by means of Chevron deference
would be devastating. Given that nonlegislative rules are exempt
from notice and comment procedure, the “affected private parties”
would be “bound by a proposition they had no opportunity to help
shape and [would] have no meaningful opportunity to challenge
when it is applied to them.”76 Moreover, if courts do not “insist
upon a delegation as to format as a condition of Chevron [deference], interpretations set forth in [nonlegislative rules] would command as much force [of law] as do legislative regulations, and
agencies could freely avoid the public procedures and safeguards
required for issuance of such regulations.”77 Here, by according
Chevron deference without addressing the format of the section
8(b) interpretation, the Kruse court indicated to HUD that it could
legally bind the public with nonlegislative rules. Consequently,
HUD may develop a routine of circumventing APA notice and comment requirements to obtain Chevron-provided binding effect for
self-serving interpretations and interpretations that do not survive
the procedures of legislative rulemaking.
The Kruse court is not the only court to have considered the
Policy Statement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit scrutinized the Policy Statement in Krzalic v. Republic
Title Co.78 With facts nearly identical to those in Kruse,79 the Krzalic
court affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the case, holding that
section 8(b) is an “anti-kickback provision” which clearly and unambiguously does not apply to mark-ups.80 Additionally, writing for
the court, Judge Posner suggested that the Policy Statement was not

75. See id. § 6.4.
76. Anthony, supra note 68, at 58.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Krzalic, 314 F.3d 875.
79. In Krzalic, a class of homebuyers sued their closing agents, alleging that they
were charged a marked-up fee of $50 for a $36 service and that the closing agents kept
the $14 difference without providing any additional services. Id. at 877.
80. See id. at 877–79.
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entitled to Chevron deference.81 Judge Posner noted that the Policy
Statement was nothing more than a “simple announcement” of
HUD’s position on mark-ups: “One fine day the [P]olicy
[S]tatement simply appeared in the Federal Register. No public
process preceded it.”82 If HUD intended the Policy Statement to be
deserving of Chevron deference, he proposed, it should have used,
“not necessarily formal adjudicative procedures or . . . [legislative]
rule-making, but, still, something more formal, more deliberate,
than a simple announcement.”83 Judge Easterbrook, in his concurring opinion, declared that “HUD’s interpretation [was] on the
Skidmore side of the line.”84
Indeed, even if Chevron deference is not appropriate, statutory
interpretations contained in nonlegislative rules are still “entitled to
respect” under Skidmore and may “constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance.”85 Skidmore deference allows a court to consider an agency’s interpretation when determining the proper interpretation of a statute.86 Here, the Kruse court could still have
concluded the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action using Skidmore
deference. The court itself could have interpreted the language of
section 8(b) to prohibit mark-ups, while giving weight to HUD’s
interpretation in the Policy Statement based “upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade.”87 In fact, the court did
this, merging Chevron deference and the Skidmore elements, when
considering HUD’s expertise and history of reflections on markups to justify according the Policy Statement Chevron deference.88
The Skidmore elements, however, only assist a court in determining
how much weight to give an interpretation, not in determining
81. Id. at 881. The Krzalic court also suggested that even if the interpretation
contained in the Policy Statement were entitled to Chevron deference, it would fail the
two-step test. See id. at 879.
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
85. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 140.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56.
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whether to give it Chevron deference. The Kruse court’s reliance on
these elements, then, confirmed that the Policy Statement was entitled only to the respect of Skidmore deference.
As Kruse illustrates, the debate over what level of deference a
court should give to an agency’s statutory interpretation contained
in a nonlegislative rule continues. In the meantime, courts must be
selective in according Chevron deference. To avoid frustrating the
APA and instigating the devastating consequences of giving binding
effect to a document that does not inherently have the force of law,
courts must consider an interpretation’s format when determining
the appropriate level of deference to apply. An interpretation contained in a nonlegislative rule, by nature of its format, should not
enjoy Chevron deference unless Congress has authorized the agency
to make binding interpretations in such rules. A delegation of authority to make interpretations in a particular format is a condition
attached to benefiting from Chevron deference.

